In seeking a satisfactory formulation of materialism, it helps to employ the notion of a possible world. Possible worlds are plausibly construed not literally as universes other than the single real universe (i.e., not as cosmoi), but rather as total ways the cosmos might be — i.e., maximal properties instantiable by the single real world (the single cosmos). On this usage, the item designated as the actual world — considered as one among the various possible worlds — is not itself the cosmos either, but rather is the total cosmos-instantiable property that is actually instantiated by the cosmos. But it will be convenient in practice to speak as though the actual world is the cosmos and as though other possible worlds are other such cosmoi — a harmless enough manner of speaking, as long as one bears in mind that it is not intended literally.
… but you're sure to damp him with some of your confounded meeknesses, or prudences, or nonsenses of some kind or another, that none of us wants to hear.
Beyin is also a wonderful beach retreat in its own right, as well as being the normal base from which to visit the unique stilted village of Nzulezo.
Would you like to take a stab at explaining the theory?
